Thursday, January 31, 2008

Mishpatim: Marriage As Penalty

An interesting insight of Abarbanel, brought down by Shadal, as to the motivation of Biblical coercion of marriage for a man who seduces a virgin. It is all about class and social status. Shemot 22:
טו וְכִי-יְפַתֶּה אִישׁ, בְּתוּלָה אֲשֶׁר לֹא-אֹרָשָׂה--וְשָׁכַב עִמָּהּ: מָהֹר יִמְהָרֶנָּה לּוֹ, לְאִשָּׁה. 15 And if a man entice a virgin that is not betrothed, and lie with her, he shall surely pay a dowry for her to be his wife.
טז אִם-מָאֵן יְמָאֵן אָבִיהָ, לְתִתָּהּ לוֹ--כֶּסֶף יִשְׁקֹל, כְּמֹהַר הַבְּתוּלֹת. {ס} 16 If her father utterly refuse to give her unto him, he shall pay money according to the dowry of virgins. {S}
Shadal writes:
[טו] וכי יפתה איש : על הרוב אין אדם מפתה נערה בתולה הראויה כפי כבודו להינשא לו, כי אם היה כן, היה שואל אותה לנשואין ; אבל הנכבדים בעיניהם בראותם את בנות האדם כי טובות הנה ויתאוו להן, יפתו אותן לשכב עמהן, ויידרו להן נדרים ללקחם לנשים, ובזה תתרצה הנערה הבתולה כדי להינשא לאיש נכבד, והוא לא כן יחשוב ולבבו לא כן ידמה, אלא למלאות בה תאוותו ולעזבה ; ע"כ ציוותה התורה שהמפתה מהור ימהרנה לו לאשה וייקחה בנשואין, אעפ"י שלא תהיה בת גילו ; אך אם יקרה הדבר בהפך, שתהיה הנערה נכבדת מן המפתה אותה, ולכן מאן ימאן אביה לתתה לו לאשה, אז כסף ישקול האיש לאביה כמוהר הבתולות לפי שפסל אותה בעיני הבחורים (דון יצחק). מהור ימהרנה לו לאשה : ייקחנה לו לאשה, וייתן לאביה כמוהר הבתולות, מה שהיו אחרים נותנים לאביה לקחת את בתו אם היתה בתולה, והמוהר הוא (לדעת רז"ל כתובות י' ע"א ; ל"ת ע"ב) חמישים כסף האמורים באונס ( דברים כ"ב כ"ט ), ורש"י פירש יכתוב לה כתובה, אבל הכתובה תקנת חכמים היא כדי שלא תהא קלה בעיניו לגרשה.

Thus, typically when a man of a higher social standing seduces a girl of a lower social standing, he does it because he does not wish to marry her. Yet he tricks her into thinking that he will marry her. This makes him follow through on his promises.

In contrast, if he is a man of lower social standing, then it would not be in the family, or girl's, best interest for her to marry him. And so they always have the right to refuse the match and make the seducer pay some monetary compensation, namely what others would have paid as dowry had she been a virgin.

Rashi, meanwhile, he notes, interprets מָהֹר יִמְהָרֶנָּה לּוֹ לְאִשָּׁה as that he writes her a ketuba, but Shadal objects that this is retrojection, for a ketubah is a later institution of Chazal. Rather, it means he marries her and gives her father the mohar. I am not so convinced by his objection, though that does not mean that I agree that this is the peshat in the pasuk.

Musical Scholar In Residence for a Modzitzer Melaveh Malka At Etz Chaim of KGH

received by email:

The Rabbi Israel D. Rosenberg Educational Institute

Congregation Etz Chaim

presents

Velvel Pasternak

world renowned expert in Chassidic music

Motzei Shabbat Terumah

February 9, 2008

8:15 PM

A Modzitzer Melaveh Malkah

The program, part lecture, part music, part tasteful refreshments, will celebrate the musical tradition of the Modzitzer Chassidic dynasty, whose melodies are known to every Jew who steps into a shul, whether at Kaballat Shabbat, Musaf, or the Yamim Noraim

The program will be dedicated in honor of Judy and Abe Keehn, who have graciously extended their chesed to our shul in so many ways over the years

$5.00 suggested donation

Congregation Etz Chaim 147-19 73 Ave. Kew Gardens Hills



In a separate email:
Our very own Rabbi Moshe Rosenberg will soon start two series of on-line shiurim at this exciting site, a burgeoning center of Torah learning.
First up is Morality for Muggles, Wednesdays February 13 - March 5, at 9:30pm Eastern Time (4 Weeks). Rabbi Rosenberg will draw on his experience teaching and writing about Harry Potter and Judaism to examine two themes each week in which each can illuminate the other. Some topics: Lost and Found, Three by Three, Manners, A Wand to Call My Own, G-d's Unbreakable Vow.
His second series will be Ta'amei Ha-Mikrah as Interpretive Tools, Wednesdays March 12 - April 2, at 9:30pm Eastern Time (4 Weeks). Far beyond mere musical instructions, the ta'amei hamikrah teach us how to divide, and thus interpret the words of Tanakh. In three sessions you will learn the hierarchy of the ta'amim, explore some of their interpretations of key verses, and observe the attitude of reverence, yet challenge, adopted by medieval parshanim towards those interpretations. An optional fourth session will deal with when one is obligated to correct a ba'al koreh, when one need not, and when one must not.
Go to www.torahinmotion.org for more information and to register.

Mishpatim: Do Not Oppress The Widow and the Orphan

The pesukim state {Shemot 22}:
כא כָּל-אַלְמָנָה וְיָתוֹם, לֹא תְעַנּוּן. 21 Ye shall not afflict any widow, or fatherless child.
כב אִם-עַנֵּה תְעַנֶּה, אֹתוֹ--כִּי אִם-צָעֹק יִצְעַק אֵלַי, שָׁמֹעַ אֶשְׁמַע צַעֲקָתוֹ. 22 If thou afflict them in any wise--for if they cry at all unto Me, I will surely hear their cry--
כג וְחָרָה אַפִּי, וְהָרַגְתִּי אֶתְכֶם בֶּחָרֶב; וְהָיוּ נְשֵׁיכֶם אַלְמָנוֹת, וּבְנֵיכֶם יְתֹמִים. {פ} 23 My wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless. {P}
Is this just imposition of morality via threats -- if you afflict, I will punish you, because you are doing wrong? I think so, to a certain extent. But I think that another part of the message is an attempt to teach empathy. And if someone cannot feel empathy for their plight, Hashem will cast their wives and children into a similar plight. Thinking about this happening to people one cares about, and how they would handle being in such a situation, might influence someone to empathize more with people who are not close relatives who are in this plight. And indeed, empathy is a theme in the immediately preceding context as well:
כ וְגֵר לֹא-תוֹנֶה, וְלֹא תִלְחָצֶנּוּ: כִּי-גֵרִים הֱיִיתֶם, בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם. 20 And a stranger shalt thou not wrong, neither shalt thou oppress him; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

Interesting Posts and Articles #12

  1. Rafi G. notes an article by Rav Yisrael Ariel about ascending the Temple Mount.
  2. Flu Vaccine in a pill.
  3. WolfishMusings notes an interesting comment on ImaMother -- don't attend a wedding where the bride wears green, and never talk to those relatives again, or risk ruining your shidduch, for associating with non-conformity.
  4. Hirhurim has a post about "The Coney Island Wig Controversy." And naturally enough, an active comment thread.
  5. Balashon has a post about the shifted meaning of rechov.

Fighting God's *Moral* Battles, and Taking Rambam Metaphorically

Note the stress on the word moral. I stress it, because it was slipped in without note in a recent article by Rabbi Shmuley Boteach, in an article in the Jerusalem Post. He writes:
"Maimonides establishes beyond the shadow of any halachic doubt that a great Jewish leader who causes the Jewish people to reembrace their tradition and fights God's moral battles - feats the Rebbe accomplished without rival - has the possibility of being the Messiah. But if he dies without having fulfilled the relevant prophecies, he is seen as an inspired leader who brought the world closer to redemption, but is not the redeemer himself."
I added the bolding there. This is important because, while he does, to my reading, clearly reject the idea that the Lubavitcher Rebbe, having died, is still the mashiach, he still considers him to have fulfilled Rambam's criteria for being bechezkat mashiach.

But this involves taking Rambam's words metaphorically, much as the meshichists take the continuation of Rambam's words metaphorically.

Rambam, in Mishneh Torah, hilchot melachim, perek 11, writes:

ח [ד] ואם יעמוד מלך מבית דויד הוגה בתורה ועוסק במצוות כדויד אביו, כפי תורה שבכתב ושבעל פה, ויכוף כל ישראל לילך בה ולחזק בדקה, ויילחם מלחמות ה'--הרי זה בחזקת שהוא משיח: אם עשה והצליח, וניצח כל האומות שסביביו, ובנה מקדש במקומו, וקיבץ נדחי ישראל--הרי זה משיח בוודאי.

ט ואם לא הצליח עד כה, או נהרג--בידוע שאינו זה שהבטיחה עליו תורה, והרי הוא ככל מלכי בית דויד השלמים הכשרים שמתו. ולא העמידו הקדוש ברוך הוא אלא לנסות בו רבים, שנאמר "ומן המשכילים ייכשלו, לצרוף בהן ולברר וללבן--עד עת קץ: כי עוד, למועד" (ראה דנייאל יא,לה).

Meshichists take the following statement about someone who is mashiach bevadai, in 8:
אם עשה והצליח, וניצח כל האומות שסביביו, ובנה מקדש במקומו, וקיבץ נדחי ישראל--הרי זה משיח בוודאי
metaphorically. Thus, bana mikdash bimkomo does not refer to the building of the Temple in the place of the Temple, that is the Beis Hamikdash built on Har HaBayis. Rather, "mikdash" refers to 770, and he built it in his, that is the Rebbe's, place, namely in Crown Heights. This is obviously silliness, but not to a true believer.

But saying that the Rebbe fought God's moral battles, and therefore Rambam's criteria for someone who is bechezkat mashiach were "feats the Rebbe accomplished without rival" also seems to me to be taking Rambam's words metaphorically. Again, in 8, we have:
ויילחם מלחמות ה'--הרי זה בחזקת שהוא משיח: אם עשה והצליח, וניצח כל האומות שסביביו

The hatzlacha here seems to be in conquering the surrounding nations. And this עשה is fighting the battles of God. Thus, it seems to be meant literally, rather than metaphorical moral battles. Indeed, continuing in 9, we read:
ואם לא הצליח עד כה, או נהרג--בידוע שאינו זה שהבטיחה עליו תורה

Thus, this is failure to fulfill the conditions of being the vadai moshiach, and that really seems to be the context of neherag here -- that he was killed in battle.

As some commentators note, Rambam seems to be basing his idea of mashiach as a physical redemption within the rules of derech hateva, but without subjugation of the nations -- like Bar Kochba had he succeeded. This idea of physical, rather than moral battles, seems a part of that.

Indeed, Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igros Moshe (look up ויילחם מלחמות) considers this as a potential proof that the people of Israel will be weapons in the time of Moshiach, but then answers that the wars will be fought miraculously. But he does not think that it means metaphorically!

The Rambam has a famous statement that (certain) midrashim are meant to be taken figuratively. Some understand that he meant this to refer to all midrash aggada. I am still unconvinced of this fact, but regardless, he is a basis in modern times for regarding every midrash aggadah to be allegorical, and anyone who thinks otherwise to be a fool.

Now, others argue with the Rambam on this, and the Rambam is not the final word on the subject.

And I think that it is a very dangerous approach to take, since, if you disagree with Chazal about something, you no longer have to worry about contradiction. Just "reinterpret" Chazal's words, so that it is not disagreement, but rather they are in reinforcing your opinion. Or else they are talking about something completely different.

Now Rambam is in the odd position of having people do exactly that to his own words, in Mishneh Torah.

Tuesday, January 29, 2008

Daf Yomi Nedarim 39b: His Illness Converges Towards Zero

Nedarim 39b, translation from my Rif blog:

ת"ר) ר' אחא ב"ר חנינא אומר כל המבקר את החולה נוטל אחד מששים מצערו
א"ל אביי א"כ לעיילו שתין ולוקמוהו
א"ל כעישורייתא דבי רבי ובבן גילו
(* The Sages learnt {in a brayta} *) R' Acha {our gemara: Abba} son of R' Chanina says: Anyone who visits a sill person takes away 1/60th of his suffering.
Abaye said {our gemara does not attribute this to Abaye}: If so, let 60 people enter and restore him!
He said to him: This is like the tenth of the house of Rabbi, and specifically someone of the same age {or under the same planetary influence}.
{in which each takes 1/60th of the remainder}
With the original assumption, if each took away 1/60th of the total, after 60 people, there would be no more illness, or else no more tzaar, left.

But even if one each one took 1/60th of the remainder, this would seem to be quite effective. With a quick calculation in Excel (put 100 in A1, in cell A2 type the formula =A1-(1/60)*A1, and then drag that formula down), we can see that after 60 visitors, the sick person would have only 36.5% left. After 100 visitors, he would have only 18.6% left. After 137 visitors, he would only have 10% left. After 200 visitors, he would have only 3.4% left. And finally, after 244 visitors, he would have 1.66% left, which is 1/60th of his illness. He would get to 1% of his illness after 274 visitors.

It will never reach 0, but it certainly converges towards that. And thus stands up to this numeric reduction. So why does the gemara not enter this rejoinder?

Perhaps it does, in also adding "and with his ben gilo," thus talking about a difficult situation to engineer. Perhaps that is what compelled it, rather than it being an alternate rejoinder.

Mishpatim: Was the Malach Metatron or Moshe?

Towards the end of Mishpatim, we find mention of a "malach" who is sent before the people of Israel in the desert. In Shemot 23:
כ הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי שֹׁלֵחַ מַלְאָךְ, לְפָנֶיךָ, לִשְׁמָרְךָ, בַּדָּרֶךְ; וְלַהֲבִיאֲךָ, אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר הֲכִנֹתִי. 20 Behold, I send an angel before thee, to keep thee by the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have prepared.
כא הִשָּׁמֶר מִפָּנָיו וּשְׁמַע בְּקֹלוֹ, אַל-תַּמֵּר בּוֹ: כִּי לֹא יִשָּׂא לְפִשְׁעֲכֶם, כִּי שְׁמִי בְּקִרְבּוֹ. 21 Take heed of him, and hearken unto his voice; be not rebellious against him; for he will not pardon your transgression; for My name is in him.
כב כִּי אִם-שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע, בְּקֹלוֹ, וְעָשִׂיתָ, כֹּל אֲשֶׁר אֲדַבֵּר--וְאָיַבְתִּי, אֶת-אֹיְבֶיךָ, וְצַרְתִּי, אֶת-צֹרְרֶיךָ. 22 But if thou shalt indeed hearken unto his voice, and do all that I speak; then I will be an enemy unto thine enemies, and an adversary unto thine adversaries.
כג כִּי-יֵלֵךְ מַלְאָכִי, לְפָנֶיךָ, וֶהֱבִיאֲךָ אֶל-הָאֱמֹרִי וְהַחִתִּי, וְהַפְּרִזִּי וְהַכְּנַעֲנִי הַחִוִּי וְהַיְבוּסִי; וְהִכְחַדְתִּיו. 23 For Mine angel shall go before thee, and bring thee in unto the Amorite, and the Hittite, and the Perizzite, and the Canaanite, the Hivite, and the Jebusite; and I will cut them off.
Who is this malach? Shadal notes a three-way dispute.
כ] הנה אנכי שולח מלאך לפניך : הקדמונים פירשו מלאך רוחני ואתרים פירשו עמוד האש והענן, ולא יובן לפי זה מאמר ושמע בקולו ; ונ"ל כדעת רלב"ג שהמלאך הוא נביא, והוא משה, ולפי שחטאו ונתעכבו במדבר, לא הביאם הוא אל הארץ ומילא יהושע את מקומו,

[כא] כי לא ישא לפשעכם : אעפ"י שהוא ענו וסבלן, אין הסליחה בידו, ואם תקניטוהו אני אענוש אתכם, כי חייבים אתם לשמוע בקולו מפני ששמי בקרבו וממני כל דבריו. שמי : אלהותי, ע"ד הנה שם ה' בא ממרחק ( ישעיה ל' כ"ז ). כי שמי בקרבו : מחובר לראש המקרא, השמר מפניו כי שמי בקרבו ( רש"י ), והוא נגד הטעמים, ולפי מה שפירשתי ייתכן גם לפי הטעמים.

[כב] אשר אדבר : כי כל דבריו דברי הם.

[כג] מלאכי : הנביא כמו למעלה, והנה לא אמר שהמלאך ישמיד האומות, אבל אמר והכחדתיו

That is, we could say that it is an "angel," as malach often means, in which case the angel has Hashem's name in him, whatever this means. Rashi says this. He writes:
Behold, I am sending an angel before you Here they were informed that they were destined to sin, and the Shechinah would say to them, “for I will not ascend in your midst” (Exod. 33: 3). -[From Exod. Rabbah 32:3]
that I have prepared to give to you. This is its simple meaning. Its midrashic interpretation is:
that I have prepared My place is already recognizable opposite it. This is one of the verses that state that the heavenly Temple is directly opposite the earthly Temple. [From Midrash Tanchuma 18]
Rashi here refers to Shemot 33:3:
א וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, לֵךְ עֲלֵה מִזֶּה--אַתָּה וְהָעָם, אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלִיתָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם: אֶל-הָאָרֶץ, אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי לְאַבְרָהָם לְיִצְחָק וּלְיַעֲקֹב לֵאמֹר, לְזַרְעֲךָ, אֶתְּנֶנָּה. 1 And the LORD spoke unto Moses: 'Depart, go up hence, thou and the people that thou hast brought up out of the land of Egypt, unto the land of which I swore unto Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, saying: Unto thy seed will I give it--
ב וְשָׁלַחְתִּי לְפָנֶיךָ, מַלְאָךְ; וְגֵרַשְׁתִּי, אֶת-הַכְּנַעֲנִי הָאֱמֹרִי, וְהַחִתִּי וְהַפְּרִזִּי, הַחִוִּי וְהַיְבוּסִי. 2 and I will send an angel before thee; and I will drive out the Canaanite, the Amorite, and the Hittite, and the Perizzite, the Hivite, and the Jebusite--
ג אֶל-אֶרֶץ זָבַת חָלָב, וּדְבָשׁ: כִּי לֹא אֶעֱלֶה בְּקִרְבְּךָ, כִּי עַם-קְשֵׁה-עֹרֶף אַתָּה--פֶּן-אֲכֶלְךָ, בַּדָּרֶךְ. 3 unto a land flowing with milk and honey; for I will not go up in the midst of thee; for thou art a stiffnecked people; lest I consume thee in the way.'
Thus, the malach is instead of Hashem Himself. Furthermore, Rashi writes:
do not rebel against him Heb. ךְתַּמֵּר, an expression of rebellion הַמְרָאָה, like “Any man who rebels (יַמְרֶה) against your orders” (Josh. 1:18).
for he will not forgive your transgression He is not accustomed to that [i.e., forgiving], for he is of the group that do not sin. And moreover, he is a messenger, and he can do only his mission. -[From Midrash Tanchuma 18]
for My Name is within him [This clause] is connected to the beginning of the verse: Beware of him because My Name is associated with him. Our Sages, however, said: This is [the angel] Metatron, whose name is like the name of his Master (Sanh. 38b). The numerical value of מֵטַטְרוֹן [314] equals that of שַׁדַּי [314]. -[From Tikunei Zohar 66b]
It seems unlikely that Tikkunei Zohar is Rashi's source, since Tikkunei Zohar is early 14th century. Rather, the borrowing would seem to be in the opposite direction. At any rate, it is clear that he considers this malach to be an angel, and specifically a special angel, Metatron (rather than the Transformer, the Decepticon named Megatron.)

Saying that an angel has God's name in him, thus granting him certain God-like status, can be quite theologically precarious.

Indeed, Elisha ben Avuya, according to Chagiga 15a, ended up concluding that there were two powers in heaven. And other sources refer to Metatron as "the Little YKVK." One example I encountered was in Bereishis Rabbasi, from Rav Moshe haDarshan, where he put forth the following (which seems echoed in other texts):

We see in Bereshit 5:
כא וַיְחִי חֲנוֹךְ, חָמֵשׁ וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה; וַיּוֹלֶד, אֶת-מְתוּשָׁלַח. 21 And Enoch lived sixty and five years, and begot Methuselah.
כב וַיִּתְהַלֵּךְ חֲנוֹךְ אֶת-הָאֱלֹהִים, אַחֲרֵי הוֹלִידוֹ אֶת-מְתוּשֶׁלַח, שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת, שָׁנָה; וַיּוֹלֶד בָּנִים, וּבָנוֹת. 22 And Enoch walked with God after he begot Methuselah three hundred years, and begot sons and daughters.
כג וַיְהִי, כָּל-יְמֵי חֲנוֹךְ, חָמֵשׁ וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה, וּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה. 23 And all the days of Enoch were three hundred sixty and five years.
What happened was a sort of apotheosis. Hashem took away Chanoch's body of flesh and blood and replaced it with a body of fire. Hashem granted him thousands of ministering angels, gave him his own Kisei haKavod, and designated him YKVK haKaton.

A Chassidic Rabbi I know told me that they do not refer to Metatron by his full name, but just call him "Metat," somewhat akin to how one does not say the Divine Name.

This all seems theologically dangerous, but others who believe in this would counter that it is true. But especially dangerous, since people addressed prayers to Metatron. For example, See here.

We could interpret it otherwise. As Shadal notes, others interpret it as not referring to an angel but rather to the pillar of fire and smoke which traveled before the Benei Yisrael in the midbar. Shadal rejects this, for it states in pasuk 21 הִשָּׁמֶר מִפָּנָיו וּשְׁמַע בְּקֹלוֹ, אַל-תַּמֵּר בּוֹ -- "Take heed of him, and hearken unto his voice" which has no meaning in the context of a pillar of fire.

Rather, Shadal favors Ralbag's explanation, that this "malach" means "messenger," as it does in several other contexts in Tanach. This is no angel, but rather is Moshe Rabbenu. The meaning is then:
כ הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי שֹׁלֵחַ מַלְאָךְ, לְפָנֶיךָ, לִשְׁמָרְךָ, בַּדָּרֶךְ; וְלַהֲבִיאֲךָ, אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר הֲכִנֹתִי. 20 Behold, I send a messenger before thee, to keep thee by the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have prepared.
This refers to Moshe. But then later, since they stayed in the midbar for longer, Moshe did not end up taking them in, but rather it was Yehoshua who took his place.

כא הִשָּׁמֶר מִפָּנָיו וּשְׁמַע בְּקֹלוֹ, אַל-תַּמֵּר בּוֹ: כִּי לֹא יִשָּׂא לְפִשְׁעֲכֶם, כִּי שְׁמִי בְּקִרְבּוֹ. 21 Take heed of him, and hearken unto his voice; be not rebellious against him; for he will not pardon your transgression; for My name is in him.

Even though Moshe is indeed quite humble, patient and forgiving, this forgiveness is not his to give -- כִּי לֹא יִשָּׂא לְפִשְׁעֲכֶם. Rather, Hashem will punish this. What about כִּי שְׁמִי בְּקִרְבּוֹ? This is the reason Moshe cannot forgive, because it is Hashem who is the source of all of his words. This works out with the trup. Meanwhile, according to Rashi, this is connected with the first part of the verse, and Shadal connects this to Yeshaya 30:27:
כז הִנֵּה שֵׁם-ה, בָּא מִמֶּרְחָק, בֹּעֵר אַפּוֹ, וְכֹבֶד מַשָּׂאָה; שְׂפָתָיו מָלְאוּ זַעַם, וּלְשׁוֹנוֹ כְּאֵשׁ אֹכָלֶת. 27 Behold, the name of the LORD cometh from far, with His anger burning, and in thick uplifting of smoke; His lips are full of indignation, and His tongue is as a devouring fire;
though noting that it is against the trup.

Then, in
כב כִּי אִם-שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע, בְּקֹלוֹ, וְעָשִׂיתָ, כֹּל אֲשֶׁר אֲדַבֵּר--וְאָיַבְתִּי, אֶת-אֹיְבֶיךָ, וְצַרְתִּי, אֶת-צֹרְרֶיךָ. 22 But if thou shalt indeed hearken unto his voice, and do all that I speak; then I will be an enemy unto thine enemies, and an adversary unto thine adversaries.
"and do all that I speak" is appropriate since all of Moshe's words are Hashem's words.

This is a nice interpretation, which avoids the theological difficulties and dangers which indeed crop up from this verse.

"This Isn't Bnei Brak"

I though this interesting enough to warrant its own post, since I am interested in the ambiguity of language.

It turns out that there are two possible interpretations of "This isn't Bnei Brak," which accord with people's preconceived notions.

When the wig store owner, who seems to have come from Bnei Brak, said "This isn't Bnei Brak," we could interpret it as:
  1. Flatbush is not a place where we impose the over-the-top stringencies on dress, like they do in Bnei Brak.
  2. Here in America, and in this neighborhood of Flatbush, you do not have Talmudei Chachamim of the caliber that we have in Bnei Brak, so do not try imposing your decided halacha on me, for you are a bunch of ignoramuses!
Of course, the first interpretation is the correct one, IMHO, in terms of what is the likely intent of the speaker of the statement, given the context given in the letter.

But the two interpretations accord with people's attitudes towards Bnei Brak before this. Modern Orthodox are more likely to think of Bnei Brak as a place with an excess of conformity in approach to many things, including chumra of tznius. Bnei Brak is a "bad" thing to be compared to. The statement is effectively "this is not Afghanistan under Taliban rule!" Saying that Flatbush is not Bnei Brak is a positive thing to say about Flatbush.

For many chareidim, Bnei Brak is a place of great kedusha, and a place of Torah greats. To cite Wikipedia, "Currently famous rabbis who reside in Bnei Brak are Rabbi Aharon Leib Shteinman, Rabbi Nissim Karelitz, Rabbi Shmuel Vozner, Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky and Rabbi Michel Yehuda Lefkowitz." Saying that Flatbush is not Bnei Brak is then a negative thing to say about Flatbush. How dare you say we are not Bnei Brak?! We also have a makom Torah, and we also have Torah greats of equal caliber!

Benei Berak indeed has both aspects to it, but the question is which is the more salient aspect to someone making this statement.

The question is what the chareidi store owner meant when he said it. It is remotely possible that he meant the latter, but I think it is far more likely that he meant the former. And that he left Bnei Brak in part to get away from such extremities of tznius.

I wonder, though, whether Bray of Fundie is alone in his interpretation of this statement, or if others interpret it like him. For example, the folks at YeshivaWorld. Or just perhaps, those avreichim from the yeshiva who spoke with the store owner and thought that he was being chutzpahdik. Just perhaps they were speaking past each other.

Any chareidim reading this, who can offer insight into this?

Update: Welcome DovBear readers. While you are here, why not take a look around? A recent interesting post was whether the malach mentioned towards the end of Mishpatim was Metatron or Moshe Rabbeinu.

Monday, January 28, 2008

The Sheitel Display

Note: I know nothing. These are just my musings.

So demonstrating the power of the "Army of Davids," DovBear put out a request that someone take a photo of the offending store display, and then posted the picture up. (See DovBear's post here.) I said I would put the picture on the blog as a show of solidarity with those who think that at the very least one should know something about the contents of the picture before making pronouncements of condemnation of it. Having seen it, I do not believe that it is pritzus, but in consideration to any reader who is worried about seeing it, I placed it towards the end of this post, so you can stop reading here. (I would encourage seeing the pictures, nonetheless.)

Seeing the picture is useful, for it helps put into perspective the issue, and to perhaps understand the dynamic in play here. It also prevents misunderstanding of what is the metizius. Over Shabbos, some people I discussed it with were sure that the women were dressed in revealing clothing, based on the description of it as pritzus.

Firstly, see the actual letter, at YeshivaWorld. Here is a link to the image. This store owner had a display of wigs, both on Styrofoam heads and in a series of color photographs. These are common in certain parts. In fact, in Kew Gardens Hills we have a store that I would say has equivalent photographs. However, this store is opposite Chaim Berlin. Actually, one thing you can see in the picture below is the reflection of the business opposite it, which is a funeral home, which a source tells me is at the end of the block.

At any rate, some avreichim went to this store owner and requested that he remove this display, for they felt that it was pritzus, since it consists of pictures of attractive women and as an advertisement is designed to draw the eyes of those who see it towards it. I do not know the content of the conversation -- the letter does not make it clear -- but it is possible that they were polite and the store-owner's reaction was one of "rudeness," in responding with such responses as "this is not Bnai Brak," or it is equally possible that they were not so respectful in their request, with the end result of prompting this reaction from the store owner.

According to the letter, the owner of the store is an Israeli who made yerida -- and it continues to say, he is fittingly called this because "he wishes to take down the taste of Torah which is among us."

I believe that such strong terms are unwarranted. That he is an Israeli who made yerida gives a bit of insight into the situation, but instead of being able to step back and understand the other person's perspective and motivations, it becomes a basis of attack.

Frankly, in Israel it is often much worse than it gets here in America, in terms of the culture clash between the secular and the religious. The secular Israelis, with some good cause, see the religious as trying to stuff religion down their throats, and to impose their religious standards upon them. And this is true even with certain groups of chareidim when interacting with religious Jews who are non-Chareidi -- they also try to impose their standards of observance on others. Some prominent recent examples are the clashes on the segregated buses, and what is going on in Ramat Bet Shemesh.

An Israeli leaves Israel for whatever reason. {Update: As Bray of Fundie points out (see comments), the store owner is a chareidi from Bnei Brak. This might provide different insight for his reaction.} Perhaps he is entirely secular, perhaps he is religious but not chareidi. And then in America, where one is supposed to have religious freedoms, suddenly a group of obvious chareidim come and try to intimidate him to take down his advertisement, which he would not naturally view as pritzus, even by certain non-chareidi yet still religious standards. His reaction would be "this is not Bnei Brak"; don't impose Bnei Brak definitions of modesty upon me here and in this neighborhood; do not intimidate me and make me change my business practice because you have certain religious standards.

His being a yored is not a negative thing to call him, and should not be a pretext for saying that his goal is to reduce that taste of Torah amongst us. This was an opportunity to understand the motivations of someone you disagree with, and to either persuade or understand one another. (The issue of the pritzus aside.) Even if you do need to call for a boycott, this misses the point, misunderstands the person, misunderstands the culture clash, and serves to distance him and those in his community from Judaism, rather than draw them closer.

Of course I may be misunderstanding him as well, not knowing enough about the situation, but at least this is an attempt to understand the other side. And with more intimate knowledge of the situation, one can find get to the bottom of this. Condemnations, and casting the person as an evildoer just doing this to be an evildoer just increases the sinas chinam on both sides.

I don't know if the boycott will be effective. They have the right to boycott, and perhaps other people will sign on to the boycott, or perhaps not. If it impacts his business, he might well cave in. But what do you think the store-owner's attitude will be? And just as bad, this is reinforcement for attitudes on the chareidi side, so what do you think their attitude will be towards people who hold differently? The types of comments at YeshivaWorld betray exactly what kind of attitudes people are being trained in. And perhaps before claiming that "who knows, perhaps all these tzaros are being caused by pritzus," think firstly that "who knows" means that even the person proclaiming it does not know, and secondly, perhaps such pronouncements plus perhaps the closed-mindedness and condemnation of different approaches could be the cause of those tzaros (just as equally, though I do not profess to know why things happen).

This is one reason I am so thankful to live in Kew Gardens Hills. There are so many niches, so many shuls with different approaches, and so many communities living side by side, within the spectrum of Orthodox Judaism. It is not necessarily the same in many other communities, where there is a pressure to conform, in terms of dress, in terms of practice, and in terms of thought.

And that is why I think that even if indeed there are pritzus problems with the advertisements according to their opinion, it is less important to remove this advertisement -- have men avert their gaze, or avoid walking near there if it is a problem -- and it is more important to develop in specifically these individuals, in specifically these communities, the idea that other people can have other opinions, and we should not force them to conform to specifically our ideals. (Of course, on some level I am doing the same, asking that they accept my ideal of tolerance.)

Another problematic aspect is the decision to solve tnius problems by making someone else modify to accommodate you. In some cases, this is justified. But in other cases, it is not so. There is an idea that an adam chashuv does not look at the face of women. Iyyov, if I recall correctly, did not look at penuyot even, lest they marry his sons and they be arayot in the future to him. But firstly, this does not mean that this extreme middat chassidut should be imposed as the standard. And even if it is, the solution was not that the women cover up but rather that the men do not look at them.

I forget which gadol it was, but a gadol was known to usually use a lot of water for washing hands. But once he did not. His students asked him why, and he pointed out that the poor maidservant was the one who had to lug all the water, and he was not going to insist on his chumra at someone else's expense. Yet here, the solution is to make the other person conform. Just as it is to make the women ride in the back; or to make the person with the television get rid of his television so that people do not peer into his house and watch; and so on. Worse than a color picture display, we have 3-D displays of the same, with real flesh, and movement. Will we make them wear veils? Not at present, but the trend seems troubling.

The women are indeed inclining their necks. This is not for the sake of pritzus. I doubt that the women were thinking of enticing men when posing, and I doubt that the store owner thought to entice the men in the yeshiva with his ad. The intent was to make the women look glamorous and pretty, so that women would see them and think that they would also look glamorous and pretty when wearing these sheitels. And inclining the neck has the effect of making the neck look longer and more graceful.

We see in Shir haShirim a praise comparing a woman's neck to a tower:
ד כְּמִגְדַּל דָּוִיד צַוָּארֵךְ, בָּנוּי לְתַלְפִּיּוֹת; אֶלֶף הַמָּגֵן תָּלוּי עָלָיו, כֹּל שִׁלְטֵי הַגִּבֹּרִים. 4 Thy neck is like the tower of David builded with turrets, whereon there hang a thousand shields, all the armour of the mighty men.
I can understand how some people in some communities might have a problem with this inclined neck. (They might consider it a come-hither neck. Heh.) Personally I do not. The problem might simply be advertisements featuring women's faces. I know that in some communities, in some newspapers and magazines, they consider this pritzus. This is unfortunate, IMHO. Especially if they do not allow for the possibility that others might hold differently.

I also think that this incredible focus on tznius as the most important thing ever is counterproductive. It has the effect of sexualizing everything. I was astounded to see in a recent discussion about mixed seating weddings that chareidim's response is that they do not need to spend the wedding ogling the friends of their wives, or the assumption that this leads to wife swapping. This assumption is so far off base, for that is absolutely not what happens at mixed weddings. But to think that this would happen if they engaged in mixed weddings tells more about their own attitudes than those who they judge.

At any rate, I know nothing, and these are just my musings on the subject. If you want to see what the basis of all this controversy/boycott is, see DovBear's post, or see the picture below:

SPOILER SPACE





































END SPOILER SPACE

Sunday, January 27, 2008

Nedarim daf 38: Feeding his Fodder to his Muddar

Heh.

The Mishna on Nedarim 38a-b reads:

וזן את אשתו ואת בניו אע"פ שהוא חייב במזונותן ולא יזון את בהמתו בין טמאה בין טהור' ר' אליעזר אומר זן את הטמאה ואינו זן את הטהור' אמרו לו מה בין טמאה לטהורה אמר להו שהטהור' נפשה לשמי' וגופה שלו וטמאה
נפשה וגופה לשמים אמרו לו אף הטמאה נפשה לשמים וגופה שלו שאם ירצה הרי הוא מוכרה <לעובדי כוכבים> {לגוים} או מאכילה לכלבים
Soncino translates:
AND HE MAY SUPPORT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN, THOUGH HE [THE MUDDAR] IS LIABLE FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE. BUT HE MAY NOT FEED HIS BEASTS, WHETHER CLEAN OR UNCLEAN. R. ELIEZER SAID: HE MAY FEED AN UNCLEAN BEAST OF HIS, BUT NOT A CLEAN ONE. THEY [THE SAGES] SAID TO HIM, WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN UNCLEAN AND A CLEAN BEAST? HE REPLIED TO THEM, THE LIFE OF A CLEAN BEAST BELONGS TO HEAVEN, BUT THE BODY IS HIS OWN; BUT AN UNCLEAN ANIMAL BELONGS BODY AND LIFE TO HEAVEN. SAID THEY TO HIM, THE LIFE OF AN UNCLEAN BEAST TOO BELONGS TO HEAVEN AND THE BODY IS HIS. FOR IF HE WISHES, HE CAN SELL IT TO A HEATHEN OR FEED DOGS WITH IT.
Note the clarification of "he" on the first line as "the muddar." This is to be pronounced as "the moo-dar" but it calls to mind the word "mudder," which is a horse which races well on muddy tracks.

The continuation of the Mishna has a dispute about whether one who vowed off giving benefit to his fellow can give fodder to his animal, and Rabbi Eliezer is of the opinion that he can give it to a non-kosher animal, such as a horse.

Thus, he can give his fodder to his muddar. Which calls to mind the not-so-famous Abbot and Costello routine:
BUD: Didn't I see you at the race track yesterday?
LOU: Yeah, I was there. I like to bet on the nags.
BUD (grabs him): Don't talk like that about horses! Do you realize that I have one of the greatest mudders in the country?
LOU: What has your mother got to do with horses?
BUD: My mudder is a horse.
LOU: What? I will admit there's a resemblance.
BUD: Now stop that!
LOU: Is your mudder really a horse?
BUD: Of course. My mudder won the first race at Hialeah yesterday.
LOU: You oughta be ashamed of yourself, putting your mudder in a horse race.
BUD: What are you talking about? My mudder used to pull a milk wagon.
LOU: What some people won't do for a living!
BUD: I take very good care of my mudder. If she don't feel like running, I
scratch my mudder.
LOU: Now ain't that cozy! I suppose if you get an itch, your mudder scratches you.
BUD: You don't follow me.
LOU: Not when you're related to a bunch of horses, I don't. I won't even
speak to you.
BUD: Will you make sense? I said I've got a fine horse and he's a mudder.
LOU (does a take): He's a mudder! How can he be a mudder?
BUD: Because he makes a better mudder than a she. Now I can't waste my
time with you. I've got to go to the track and feed my mudder.
LOU: And what do you give the old lady for breakfast--oats?
BUD: Don't be old-fashioned. Modern mudders don't eat oats. They eat their
fodder.
LOU: What did you say?
BUD: I said I feed my mudder his fodder.
LOU: What have you got--a bunch of cannibals?

Friday, January 25, 2008

Interesting Links #11

  1. My Machberes discusses new Satmar takkanot restricting expenses for bar mitzvas and weddings.
  2. Meir came back from a play date the other day wanting me to show him pictures of giraffes from Google image search. This is a process that usually involves a lot of mouse clicks to see each image, large. But after searching, I found a service that makes a slideshow of such images. Check it out here.
  3. Peep And The Big Wide World. They have a different video of Peep on every day. Charming, cute, and educational, for kids.
  4. Endoscope in a pill.
  5. Boycotting a sheitel store because of faces of women on ads on the outside of the store. I think that WolfishMusings was entirely in the right asking what he asked (even if ultimately to the folks in that forum it does not matter), and furthermore, that the situation and more particularly the reaction there is an unfortunate blend of tnius chumras to an excess; Daas Torah to the exclusion of even intellectual curiosity and to the extent of closed-mindedness; and elevation of communal approach to the level of din to the extent that anyone who takes a different approach is a kofer. This is not kedusha but closed-mindedness, and some people do not recognize the difference.
    They have the right to boycott, but I hope it is not a successful boycott.
    I see that Emes veEmuna took a stand on this.
    And in a show of solidarity, if someone wins DovBear's contest and produces the pictures in question, I'll post them as well here.

The Age of Trup -- part xviii

Shadal continues his Vikuach al Chochmat haKabbalah. (See last segment.) In the main text (rather than footnotes) of the previous segment, the guest defined masoret as the plene and deficient spellings of words, noting that "if they had a masorah such as we have with us today they would not have doubts or disputes, this one with the other in the reading of some of the words." The author now picks up on this.

The author: Where are they divided, and where are they in doubt, about the reading of the words?

The guest: First off, in what I informed you off before: {In Avodah Zarah 35a:} He said to him, "Yishmael my brother, how do you read {Shir haShirim 1:2} : Ki tovim dodecha or Ki tovim dodayich?" He said to him, "Ki tovim dodayich." He said to him, "The matter is not so, for behold its fellow {=the context, in Shir haShirim 1:3} proves it: לְרֵיחַ שְׁמָנֶיךָ טוֹבִים, שֶׁמֶן תּוּרַק שְׁמֶךָ; עַל-כֵּן, עֲלָמוֹת אֲהֵבוּךָ. {All of which are directed towards the man. We could have cast this, of course, as an exchange between the lovers, but the argument here is that the context proves that it is directed towards the man.}

The author: This is not proof that they did not have the masorah, for the masorah does not inform about the reading of the words {but only the consonants}, after the nikkud teaches how it is. However this is in the appearance of a proof that there was no nikkud {points} in the time of our Rabbis.

The guest: And why do you say "in the appearance of a proof," and not "proof?"

The author: Because there are of the Sages who say that the nikkud was already found in the holy tongue of old, but not all the sefarim had nikkud, except in those words which it was possible to err in them; for so decided the author of the Meor Einayim (perek 59), that the nikkud was given at Sinai, and afterwards it was forgotten, and the Sages of Tiberius reinstituted it.

And similar to this is the opinion of one who writes the dikduk which is around the masorah, who said at the beginning of his words "It is true that the nikkud was given at Sinai, but they forgot it, until Ezra came and revealed it."

The guest: If it was so that nikkud was known to the early ones, but they only made use of it by words where there could be a question, how did the teacher of Yoav not see any sefer which had the nikkud under ther word zecher in the verse timche et zecher Amalek, such that he taught Yoav z'char with a sheva under the zayin and a patach under the chaf? And if afterwards it was forgotten and Ezra came and reinstated it, how was it further forgotten? Was it not the case that from the days of the Men of the Great Assembly and on, there was not a generation that did not have in it great Sages in Israel, and the chain of tradition is known to us without interruption; and how did they say (in Kiddushin 30) verses also we cannot number, in verses we are not experts, that when Rav Acha bar Ada came, he said, "in the West {=Eretz Yisrael} the divide this verse into three verses {Shemot 19:9} וַיֹּאמֶר ה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי בָּא אֵלֶיךָ בְּעַב הֶעָנָן, בַּעֲבוּר יִשְׁמַע הָעָם בְּדַבְּרִי עִמָּךְ, וְגַם-בְּךָ יַאֲמִינוּ לְעוֹלָם; וַיַּגֵּד מֹשֶׁה אֶת-דִּבְרֵי הָעָם, אֶל-ה?

The author: This is no proof, for there they said as well "they were experts in plene and deficient words, and we are not experts"; and behold, plene and deficient words are a written matter, and even so there arose in it doubts after Ezra. If so, like this matter, we are able to say as well that Ezra established the nikkud, and afterwards it once again was forgotten, until there were born by our Rabbis doubts and disputes.
ss

Thursday, January 24, 2008

Tu Bishvat: The Prayer for a Beautiful Esrog

I received the following via email the other day. It is a tefilla for a beautiful and kosher esrog. It appears and was instituted in the sefer Leshon Chachamim from the Ben Ish Chai. He writes that it is accepted amongst the Chachmei Ashkenaz that one needs to implore, on the day of Tu B'Shvat, specifically about the etrog, that Israel should manage to have good etrogim. And once they mention etrog, a prayer for the rest of the fruits of trees as well.

Choshvei Shemo has the text (rather than picture) in electronic form, and he provides a translation, though it is a shorter text and therefore a shorter translation.

Now, saying this particular tefillah, or for that matter any tefillah on Tu Be-shvat for an etrog on Succot, is not my minhag, even if it was mekubal etzel kol chachmei Ashkenaz. And I am not about to adopt a new minhag just because it is being passed around the intertubes, be it via email forwards or on blogs. I might evaluate whether I agree with the aims of the minhag or tefillah and decide to adopt it. But just because I am told it was mekubal a while back does not mean I will change my existing custom to incorporate this practice as well.

I have my suspicions that what is happening here, in modern times (rather than the motivation back then), is that there is a vacuum of ritual acts and prayer on Tu BeShvat, because it is an halachic fiscal new year, rather than a real chag like other Jewish holidays. Therefore, people look to adopt rituals and tefillot for this day, and so they seize upon the kabbalistic Tu BiShvat seder condemned by Rav Yaakov Emden, and so they say a prayer for an etrog even though they are not really worried about their etrog.

And this is the sticking point for me. Back then, amongst the Chachmei Ashkenaz, there was a real concern that the Jews in their community would not be able to gain access to a kosher or mehudar etrog. Etrogim were scarce, and it was common for there to be a single etrog for an entire Jewish community, which cost them a king's ransom. Since etrogim were so scarce, one could only hope and pray that the etrog they got would not have any of the potential problems mentioned in the tefillah. There was real reason for this prayer.

But nowadays, through the aid of Hashem, etrogim are in extreme abundance. You can buy a lulav and etrog set that Jewish communities in Europe could only dream of, for about $30. And if you are willing to spend more, you can get even more and more mehudar. Is anyone who says this tefillah nowadays in any degree really worried that the Jewish community will not get mehudar esrogim and will be unable to perform the mitzvah? I seriously doubt it. Rather, the resurgence of this tefillah is a fad, to fill the gap in ritual and prayer. As such, I will not say it and change my existing custom. Had the situation nowadays been true back then, I strongly suspect the Chachmei Ashkenaz would not have seen the need to say it either.

The Resprinklification of Cupcakes

I came up with the following idea the other day, and it seems to work well. You know how some people prefer the tops of muffins? Well, Meir prefers the tops of cupcakes, and on the occasion that I get him one, he only eats the top. This is a waste of a cupcake. So I got some rainbow sprinkles from the local grocery, and sprinkled them on top of the now-barren cupcake. 40 seconds in the microwave to get them to melt on the top, a few minutes in the refrigerator to cool, and they are good as new, and he'll eat more. (I don't first put on a layer of frosting, as they do when they first bake them.)

The Age of Trup -- part xvii

Shadal continues his Vikuach Al Chochmat Hakabbalah. Here he continues the age of masorah, bringing a third witness. He talks about the definition of baalei masorah, and then the definition of yesh em lamikra and yesh em lamesorah. (See previous segment.)

And he said to me: And now take for me the first chelek of the sefer Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, and hear a third witness.

And I took the sefer, and he found written in it, in the law of sefer Torah, perek 8:
"And because I saw a great mix-up in all the sefarim {=sifrei Torah} that I saw in these matters, and also the baalei haMasoret, who write and author to inform of the petuchot and setumot {gaps}, are divided in these matters just as is the dispute in the sefarim upon which they rely, I have seen {fit} to write here all of the parshiyot in the Torah, the setumot and the petuchot, and the form of the songs {how they are formatted}, in order to fix based upon them all the sefarim and to correct from them. And the sefer that we have relied upon in these matters is the sefer known in Egpyt, which encompasses the 24 books {of Tanach}, which was in Yerushalayim for many years to correct sefarim from it, and upon it all are reliant, for Ben Asher corrected it and was precise in it for many years, and made many corrections, as they are encoded of old {?}, and upon it I based myself in the Torah I wrote in accordance with its halacha.

And the man said to me: Here to you it is clear that the baalei haMasoret did not arise under after the closing of the Talmud, and also after Ben Asher.

The author: See, your words are good and correct (*) but the Sages of the Talmud many times mentioned the masoret, and Rabbi Akiva said that the masoret is a fence to the Torah.

(*) It appears to me now that the Rambam is not referring to the masorah, for in the masora they do not encode the petuchot and setumot. But rather he is speaking about a few of the later people {"acharonim"} who are writing about these matters. However, the author of the Chovot haLevavot mentions Ibn Janach first, because of his stature, and there is no doubt that the Baalei haMesorah preceded Rabbi Yonah Ibn Janach and all of the grammarians.

The guest: You have not reached to the depths of their intent, for masoret that they mentioned is like its name -- something given over from one mouth to the next, and not like the Masorah we have which is written; and that which they taught orally, and which they called by the name masoret, was only to know which word was spelled plene and which deficient, as they said "the mikra is determinant; the masoret is determinant." The mikra is the way of reading, such as besukkot, while masoret is the way of writing, such as besukkat {for there is no vav in the word} (**); However the masoret of the early ones does not touch at all on the matter of the vowels {nekudot} and trup. And with a clear speech the Tosafot and the Rosh said in Nedarim 37 that the masoret is the plene and deficient spellings; if they had a masorah such as we have with us today they would not have doubts or disputes, this one with the other in the reading of some of the words.

(**) The Rif already asked why did they say yesh em and not yesh av, as they say {elsewhere} bana av. And he answered well, and I come after him and complement his words. For the mishpacha {family} of the father is called family, but not the family of the mother, and the mother is called to her {immediate} children, but the father is called father also to the descendants of his descendants after they are divided into families.

And behold a binyan av, and so to avuhon dechulhu dam, the intent is that it teaches many matters which are not similar, one to the other, like brothers, but rather they are of different types, and it is as if they are of different families.

But yesh em lamikra is a different matter, and the word em has as its meaning "source" (as they say {in Bechorot 4:4}: עד שחותכין את (האום שלה, בשביל שלא תלד and the intent is to say that the reading which one pronounces has a trustworthy source, and this is the main meaning according to a few, and according to the opinion of others the masoret has a trustworthy source, and it is the primary meaning.

And Rabbi Wolf Heidenheim in Moda' LaBinah {a Chumash with Rashi and the author's supercommentary on Rashi} at the end of the book of Devarim explains "em" from the language of imot hakeriah (matres lectiones), and this is a nickname common in the mouths of gentile grammarians, and they call this to resting letters, and before them Radak (not the author of sefer Yetzira {?} called them imot hasippur.

And Rabbi Wolf Heidenheim said that yesh em lamikra's implication is that the letters which are called mothers are for the completion of the reading, that is to say that it is only to draw out the pronunciation of the vowel, and one should not bother oneself if the "mother" is absent; and the meaning of yesh em lamesoret is that the mothers are also for the completion of the masorah, that is to say the completion of the writing of the word, aside from what they teach about the reading, and therefore where they are absent (such as in besukkat {that is, without the vav}, the word needs to be darshened.

And I say that even if it is accept (that upon which there is no proof) that the early ones {kadmonim} called "mothers" to resting letters, still this explanation does not rest well with the language yesh em.

For behold, to the words of Rabbi Wolf Heidenheim, yesh em la... its meaning is: The "mothers" are only for such and such.

And what will Rabbi Wolf Heidenheim say and one who says that yesh mazal leYisrael means that the constellations {? mazalot} were only created for Israel? And behold, just as "there is mazal to Yisrael" and "mazalot are for Yisrael" are two statements which are extremely different from one another, so to "yesh em lamikra" and "the mothers are for mikra" are not the same thing.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Supreme Court Rules on Prat UKlal

At least, that is my reading of the decision. To cite the BLT blog:
Invoking the Federal Tort Claims Act, inmate Abdus-Shahid Ali sued the bureau for losing some of his personal belongings during a prison transfer. The government, supported by all lower courts and now the Supreme Court, said Ali's claim should be dismissed, because of an exception in the law that gives immunity from liability for "any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer."

...

Thomas rules that the phrase is "disjunctive, with one specific and one general category," and therefore can be read to refer to "any" law enforcement officer, not just customs officers. Thomas is joined by Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. and Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Samuel Alito Jr.

...

Au contraire, say Kennedy and Breyer in dissent. Kennedy argues that the comma in the middle of the text at issue does not divorce the clause that follows from what went before (and therefore, the exemption only applies to customs officers.)
Read the whole post, for there is more that is interesting.

To focus again on the various interpretations, the exception in the law exception in the law that gives immunity from liability for
"any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer."
Now, this was not a customs officer, but rather a prison officer, thus a law enforcement officer, who was not related in any way to assessment or collection of tax or customs duty. You have "detention of goods" by a list of three classes of people, and the final entry in that list is "any other law enforcement officer."

Thus, we have "the detention of any goods, merchandise or other property" by one of three classes, and the last class is "any other law enforcement officer."

The class " any other law enforcement officer" is a general class, and the question is how wide to expand this? Do we include only those law enforcement officers involved in customs, like the other two items on the list (any officer of customs; or excise; or any other law enforcement officer)? This is what the petitioner claims.

To cite from the actual ruling:
In petitioner’s view, “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” should be read as a three-item list, and the final, catchall phrase “any other law enforcement officer” should be limited to officers of the same nature as the preceding specific phrases.
To put it in halachic terms, he wishes to claim that prat uchlal (specific followed by general), ain bechlal ela ke`ein haperat (what the general class comes to include is only things similar to those listed in the specifics). That is not the halachic linguistic rule. That halachic linguistic rule is reserved for a similar construction: klal ufrat uchlal, where there is a general class followed by a specific class or classes, followed by another general class.

However, the halachic linguistic rule is not in play. The petitioner suggests that a certain rule of statutory construction, namely that of ejusdem generis, should be in play. Basically, it means ain bechlal ela ke`ein haperat, as above. Or, to cite the law dictionary:
Lat: of the same kind. A rule of statutory construction, generally accepted by both state and federal courts, "that where general words follow enumerations of particular classes or persons or things, the general words shall be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as those enumerated." 49 F. Supp. 846, 859. Thus, in a statute forbidding the concealment on one's person of "pistols, revolvers, derringers, or other dangerous weapons," the term "dangerous weapons" may be construed to comprehend only dangerous weapons of the kind enumerated, i.e., firearms, or perhaps more narrowly still, handguns.
However, Justice Thomas, together with the majority, distinguish between this classic case and the case at hand. The classic case has a list of several items (e.g. pistols, revolvers, derringers) followed by a general clause (or other dangerous weapons). That is prat ufrat ufrat uchlal. In such a case, the general clause is of a like type, and we apply ejusdem generis.

In contrast, the case at hand was just a single specific class followed by a single general class. That is, he does not read "any officer of customs or excise" as two separate classes, but rather a single class. Indeed, I would say (but haven't seen if he said this), we do not have "officer of" repeated there, as in "any officer of customs, officer of excise, or..." but rather "officer of" distributes between "customs or excise." So it is a single specific class. It is them followed by the general class, of “any other law enforcement officer.” If so, it is not prat ufrat ufrat uchlal, but rather just prat uchlal, in which case the klal includes everything.

Once again, to cite the ruling:
The phrase is disjunctive, with one specific and one general category,not—like the clauses at issue in Keffeler and Dolan—a list of specific items separated by commas and followed by a general or collective term. The absence of a list of specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem generis that Congress remained focused on the commonattribute when it used the catchall phrase.
That is indeed what happens by the halachic prat uchlal -- the klal comes to include everything.

The ruling goes on to say that even if it were to be interpreted as the general class being akin to the specific classes, it is unclear that the petitioner's proffered characteristic should be the defining one.

The petitioner also tried to advance other arguments, such as context informing the definition of "any officer."

A bit later, the ruling notes that:
Had Congress intended to limit §2680(c)’s reach as petitioner contends, it easily could have written“any other law enforcement officer acting in a customs or excise capacity.”
This would be perhaps a miut achar ribbuy? But we aren't analyzing it from that perspective here.

Justice Kennedy's dissent makes sense to me, arguing that meaning is based on context, and the statute was clearly written in terms of customs and taxes.

He notes that that the justices "Plac[e] implicit reliance upon a comma at the beginning of a clause." That seems true enough. Once again, the law in question was immunity from liability for
"any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer."
That first comma is being read is divorcing "the detention of any goods, merchandise or other property" from the earlier group.

And besides this, he addresses whether ejusdem generis can apply to things other than laundry lists of items.

Note: It is quite possible I misunderstood some or all of this, as I am not a lawyer.

The blogger there noted that "Excelling at grammar has not seemed to be among the skills required of a Supreme Court justice." But my training in Jewish law makes it not seem so shocking to me that the law hinges on such grammatical constructions and analyses.

Tu BeShvat: "For Man Is Like A Tree In The Field"

A Google search for The Torah tells us that man is like the tree of the field yields many, many results, many of which make no mention of the fact that the pashut peshat of the pasuk is as a rhetorical question, that of course a man is not a tree in a field. Or rather, of course a tree in a field is not a man, so why should you attack it.

I wonder how many people who state this benichusa know the simple intent of the pasuk.

As the pasuk reads {Devarim 20:19}:
יט כִּי-תָצוּר אֶל-עִיר יָמִים רַבִּים לְהִלָּחֵם עָלֶיהָ לְתָפְשָׂהּ, לֹא-תַשְׁחִית אֶת-עֵצָהּ לִנְדֹּחַ עָלָיו גַּרְזֶן--כִּי מִמֶּנּוּ תֹאכֵל, וְאֹתוֹ לֹא תִכְרֹת: כִּי הָאָדָם עֵץ הַשָּׂדֶה, לָבֹא מִפָּנֶיךָ בַּמָּצוֹר. 19 When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by wielding an axe against them; for thou mayest eat of them, but thou shalt not cut them down; for is the tree of the field man, that it should be besieged of thee?
Rashi writes:
Is the tree of the field a man, to go into the siege before you? The word כִּי here means“perhaps:” Is the tree of the field perhaps a man who is to go into the siege by you, that it should be punished by the suffering of hunger and thirst like the people of the city? Why should you destroy it?
And so others.

What in the pasuk makes it a rhetorical question? Rashi considers it the word ki in
כִּי הָאָדָם עֵץ הַשָּׂדֶה.

Shadal notes two other possibilities, and maintains the last as correct:
רש " י אומר שהיא במילת כי , ומדקדק גדול ספרדי ( הביאו ראב " ע ) אמר שנשמטה הה " א ( על דרך שם כ " ז כ " ג אתה זה בני עשו , וזולתו ), והנכון כדברי בעל העקדה שהתמימה היא באות ה " א שבמילת האדם , ואע " פ שהיא קמוצה איננה לידיעה , אלא לתמימה , כמו ( שם י " ט ט ') האחד בא לגור , האיש אחד יחטא ( במדבר ט " ז כ " ב ); כן כתב בעל העקדה , וכן נכון בלא ספק , כי ( כל זמן שלא נרצה לפרש כראב " ע כי חיי האדם עץ השדה , פירוש אשר כבר נדחה ונתבטל ), אין כאן מקום לה " א הידיעה , כי אדם הוא כאן לדברי הכול נשוא , לא נושא , ושם דבר שהוא נשוא לא יקבל הידיעה , כמו ( שם כ " ג י " ט ) לא איש קל ויכזב , לא אדם הוא להנחם ( ש " א ט " ו כ " ט ); ואין לתמוה שתבוא ה " א השאלה ולפניה " כי ", כי הנה לנו דוגמתה כי התחת אלקים אני ( בראשית נ ' י " ט ), כי האמנם ישב אלקים על הארץ ( מלכים א ' ח ' כ " ז )
.
Thus, one possibility, cited by Ibn Ezra, is that there was a heh chataf patach designating a question, which elided. An example of this phenomenon is in parshat Toldot, in which Yitzchak asks: וַיֹּאמֶר, אַתָּה זֶה בְּנִי עֵשָׂו; וַיֹּאמֶר, אָנִי.

(Update: Though Ibn Ezra does take this as a statement rather than a question. See inside.)

But Shadal sides with the Baal haAkeida, who claims that the heh kametz of הָאָדָם is the heh hashe`ela, asking a question, rather than heh hayidia, the definite article. For the definite article has no place here. As to the kamatz, this is acceptable for the questioning heh, as we see in parshat Vayera:

וַיֹּאמְרוּ גֶּשׁ-הָלְאָה, וַיֹּאמְרוּ הָאֶחָד בָּא-לָגוּר וַיִּשְׁפֹּט שָׁפוֹט--עַתָּה, נָרַע לְךָ מֵהֶם; וַיִּפְצְרוּ בָאִישׁ בְּלוֹט מְאֹד, וַיִּגְּשׁוּ לִשְׁבֹּר הַדָּלֶת.

and also here:
וַיִּפְּלוּ עַל-פְּנֵיהֶם, וַיֹּאמְרוּ, אֵל, אֱלֹהֵי הָרוּחֹת לְכָל-בָּשָׂר: הָאִישׁ אֶחָד יֶחֱטָא, וְעַל כָּל-הָעֵדָה תִּקְצֹף.

The upgrade of the chataf patach to kametz in this context presumably has to do with the aleph following it.

And in terms of heh hashe`eila following ki, we have examples of this, such as in the last perek of Bereishit, in parshat Vayechi:
יט וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם יוֹסֵף, אַל-תִּירָאוּ: כִּי הֲתַחַת אֱלֹהִים, אָנִי. 19 And Joseph said unto them: 'Fear not; for am I in the place of God?

Yitro: The Meaning of the Trup and Nikkud of לֹ֥א תַֽעֲשׂ֖וּן אִתִּ֑י אֱלֹ֤הֵי כֶ֨סֶף֙ וֵֽאלֹהֵ֣י זָהָ֔ב לֹ֥א תַֽעֲשׂ֖וּ לָכֶֽם׃

As asked by an anonymous commentator on this other post on parshablog, what is the meaning of לֹ֥א תַֽעֲשׂ֖וּן אִתִּ֑י אֱלֹ֤הֵי כֶ֨סֶף֙ וֵֽאלֹהֵ֣י זָהָ֔ב לֹ֥א תַֽעֲשׂ֖וּ לָכֶֽם׃?

After all, the etnachta is on the word itti, giving us two apparent separate instructions:
You shall not make [images of anything that is] with Me.
and
Gods of silver or gods of gold you shall not make for yourselves.

Such is the Judaica Press translation, following Rashi's commentary, based in turn on Mechilta:
You shall not make [images of anything that is] with Me You shall not make a likeness of my servants who serve Me on high. — [from Mechilta, R.H. 24]
Gods of silver This [statement] comes to warn about the cherubim, which you make to stand with Me [in the Temple], that they may not be [made] of silver, for if you deviate to make them of silver, they are to Me as gods. — [from Mechilta]
or gods of gold This [statement] comes to warn [us] that one shall not add [more cherubim] to [the two, which is the number God required]. For if you make four [cherubim], they are to Me as gods of gold. — [from Mechilta]
you shall not make for yourselves You shall not say, “I will make cherubim in the synagogues and in the study halls, in the manner that I make [them] in the Temple.” Therefore, it says: “you shall not make for yourselves.” -[from Mechilta]
Note how the portion before the etnachta is about making images of the servants who serve God on high. Thus, "you shall not make [those who are] with Me." And everything after the etnachta is about the keruvim. Either the trup's division is made based on the rabbinic explanation askin to what we find in the Mechilta, or else vice versa, or else they independently arise at this parse.

The alternative parse, against the trup, is:
You shall not make with Me gods of silver;
And gods of gold you shall not make for yourselves.
This has a nice Biblical parallelism, in my opinion, with a chiastic structure: "gods of silver" matching "gods of gold"; and "You shall not make with Me" matching "you shall not make for yourselves."

But it would indeed appear to be against the trup.

A picture of the parse tree drawn by the trup would be as pictured to the right. Note how lo saasun iti branches off first.

That would be my explanation of the trup. For in לֹ֥א תַֽעֲשׂ֖וּן אִתִּ֑י אֱלֹ֤הֵי כֶ֨סֶף֙ וֵֽאלֹהֵ֣י זָהָ֔ב לֹ֥א תַֽעֲשׂ֖וּ לָכֶֽם׃, the etnachta makes that first branch, at itti. Then, the zakef on "zahav" and the tipcha on "taasu" both subdivide a clause ending in silluk (and sof pasuk), but since zahav is earlier in the verse, it must divide first. And then, within "elokei chesef veilokei zakav," there is a subdivision via the pashta on chesef in half.

While on the subject of this pasuk, we might as well note Shadal's interpretation, in which he argues that the nikkud on itti was not the original nikkud. He writes:
לא תעשון אתי : לפי הניקוד לא תעשו דבר לשתפו עמי, אמנם אין זה מתיישב כלל עם מה שלפניו ועם מה שאחריו, ונ"ל לקרוא לא תעשון אותי, כלומר לא תעשו צורתי, לא תציירוני בשום צורה, ופירש ואמר אלהי כסף ואלהי זהב לא תעשו לכם אפי' לזכרון שמים (כפירוש רשב"ם), וזה בכוונה להוריד שפע האל למטה : אינך צריך לכל זה, אלא מזבח אדמה תעשה לי ; ואתה מבין כי "אתי" הוא תיקון שתיקנו חכמים, כי מליצת תעשון אותי היתה קשה על ההמון.
Thus, the implication of itti on a peshat level is something to combine with God, that is shittuf. But he does not think this works out with the simple context.

Rather, he claims it originally read Oti, thus "You shall not make Me," that is you should not fashion Me in any form. Thus, the pasuk continues to explain that they should not make any idol. These idols of gold and silver would be the forbidden creation of a form for God. Rather (next pasuk), you should make an altar of earth for me.

This explanation would work out with the trup's division.

He also claims that this was not an error on the part of the one who wrote the nikkud, or an error in transmission from the original pronunciation. Rather, he has it as a "tikkun chachamim," deliberate, for the general populace would not understand the difficult idiom of "making Me," which means fashioning God's form into an idol. (Perhaps they might think it as the ability of man to make God into God.)

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