Friday, March 09, 2007

Daf Yomi Megillah daf 28: What Kind Of Levity Cannot Be Done In A Synagogue?

On the Permissibility of Talking in Shul, of Having a Purim Play in Shul, and of Circuses

A brayta forbids levity, as well as eating, drinking, etc., in a shul. This was true of the shuls in Eretz Yisrael, but not in Bavel, where they made a precondition:
Rif citing Megillah 28a-b:
ועוד אמר ר' יהודה וכו'.
ת"ר בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן
א"ר יהודה אימתי בישובן אבל בחרבנן מניחין אותן ועולין בהן עשבים מפני עגמת נפש:
"And Rabbi Yehuda further said":
The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: Synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. We do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, nor do we enter them in sunny days to get out of the sun and on rainy days to get out of the rain. However, we read therein and learn therein, and deliver a eulogy of the public, and we sweep them and sprinkle water on them {after sweeping}.

R' Yehuda said: When? When they are extant, but when they are destroyed, we leave them alone and weeds grow in them, in order to cause anguish.

א"ר אסי בתי כנסיות שבבבל על תנאי הן עשויות ואעפ"כ אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש
ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה:

Rabbi Assi said: The synagogues in Bavel were made with a precondition, and even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.
And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.
Note that the brayta does not mention sichat chullin, but it makes its way in there by the time it gets to Shulchan Aruch.

Let us turn our attention to the gemara and see what we can make of it. Firstly, the brayta.

ועוד אמר ר' יהודה וכו'.
ת"ר בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן
א"ר יהודה אימתי בישובן אבל בחרבנן מניחין אותן ועולין בהן עשבים מפני עגמת נפש:
"And Rabbi Yehuda further said":
The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: Synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. We do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, nor do we enter them in sunny days to get out of the sun and on rainy days to get out of the rain. However, we read therein and learn therein, and deliver a eulogy of the public, and we sweep them and sprinkle water on them {after sweeping}.
There are two ways to parse this brayta. In the first parsing, kalut rosh is disjoint from the other activities. Thus, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. Furthermore, do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, etc.. However, we do read therein and learn therein, etc.

In the second parsing, kalut rosh is not disjoint, but rather, the relationship is definitional. That is, synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. How so? We do not eat therein, etc., for this would be considered conducting ourselves with levity.

Proof for this second parsing is the lack of connective vav between levity and eating, and a connective vav introducing every subsequent activity. It is as if there is a colon present, such that the parse would be:
אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש: אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן

Still, even if this second parse of the brayta is correct, it would seem (at least at first glance) that the eventual halacha as formulated in the gemara views kalut rosh as disjoint, a separate activity from the rest.

Now let us turn to the gemara, and see how Amoraim interpret this brayta, and what novelties they add to the picture.
א"ר אסי בתי כנסיות שבבבל על תנאי הן עשויות ואעפ"כ אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש
ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה:

Rabbi Assi said: The synagogues in Bavel were made with a precondition, and even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.
And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.
Rabbi Assi thus states that we have an exception to the stringencies stated in the brayta, because of preconditions made on the synagogues in Bavel. Even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.

How does Rabbi Assi view kalut rosh and its relationship with the remainder of the activities in the brayta? Are they disjoint, or are the activities definitional?

From Rav Assi's statement in and of itself, we have no help. It could be either. That is, the activities in the brayta might well be definitional of kalut rosh. If so, Rabbi Assi would be saying that in truth, because of preconditions made on synagogues in Bavel, all manner of activity is permitted in these synagogues, namely, those activities listed in the brayta are permitted. However, even so, we do not avail ourselves of this precondition and still do not do any of those activities. Thus, we may not eat or drink in a synagogue, etc.. Rabbi Assi's statement would then be a stringent one.

On the other hand, Rabbi Assi might consider kalut rosh and the other activities to be disjoint. Indeed, that is the common reading of his statement, supporting in large part by the setama digmara's definition which immediately follows (and which we shall discuss in short order). If so, there are preconditions made on synagogues that allow all manner of activity mentioned in the brayta to be performed in those synagogues. However, perhaps those preconditions did not cover, or could not cover, such extreme disrespect to the sanctity of the synagogue as kalut rosh, whatever that may be. Alternatively, perhaps those preconditions do indeed cover kalut rosh, but even so, as an extra stringency, we refuse to conduct ourselves with kalut rosh therein.

Regardless, the way Rabbi Assi uses the term kalut rosh is not necessarily identical with or indicative of how he parses kalut rosh in the brayta.

The setama digmara clearly considers Rabbi Assi's definition of kalut rosh to be disjoint from the other activities in the brayta. Thus, the setama defines kalut rosh as "calculations," cheshbonot, whatever they may be.

What influences the setama to give such a definition? There are two factors I would point out (among possibly others). First, there is the juxtaposition of Rabbi Assi's statement with that of Rav Sheshet, disallowing cheshbonot. Secondly, what was cited above was the Rif's girsa of the gemara, and has Rav Sheshet making this second statement. However, our girsa of the gemara has Rabbi Assi making both statements. If this girsa is the original and what the setama had before him, it makes sense to view Rabbi Assi's second statement as definitional of the first.

Let us now turn to Rav Sheshet (/Rav Assi's second) statement:
ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה
And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.
What are cheshbonot, and how is one mechashev cheshbonot? The standard translation is "business calculations." This definition, however, gives me extreme pause. After all, the setama uses this as a definition of levity, kalut rosh. Somehow, when I imagine a bunch of accountants going over the books, levity is not the first thing that comes to mind. On the other hand, we need not take kalut rosh as the English term of levity, but rather as not treating the synagogue with the utmost respect and awe it deserves, in which case doing mundane business calculations can well be a definition of kalut rosh. If so, one can readily extend this prohibition to other mundane treatments and uses of a synagogue -- perhaps including sichat chullin. Still, this is not the first interpretation I would seize upon, if there was another interpretation available.

I have another problem with Rav Sheshet's statement. What in the world is the relationship between accountants doing business calculations in a synagogue and keeping a met mitzvah overnight? Sure, the met mitzvah might be viewed as punishment of death for what was done, but isn't this punishment somewhat random? I would expect some sort of poetic justice, some sort of middah kineged middah in Rav Sheshet's statement!

Indeed, I have another explanation of cheshbonot that renders Rav Sheshet's statement much more poetic, and which helps explain what the setama saw to make the statement definitional of kalut rosh.

In July 2005, I wrote a post about the permissibility of circuses, considering the gemara which appears to outlaw in, in tandem with a contemporary Christian writing which did the same (and used some of the same "derashot" and many of the same terms), in order to determine what exactly was being forbidden and in what contexts. It is a good post -- check it out.

One part of that gemara {Avodah Zarah 18b} reads:
ורמינהי [הולכין] לאיצטדינין מותר מפני שצווח ומציל ולכרקום מותר מפני ישוב מדינה ובלבד שלא יתחשב עמהם ואם נתחשב עמהם אסור
קשיא איצטדינין אאיצטדינין קשיא כרקום אכרקום
בשלמא כרקום אכרקום ל"ק כאן במתחשב עמהן כאן בשאין מתחשב עמהן
אלא איצטדינין אאיצטדינין קשיא
תנאי היא [דתניא] אין הולכין לאיצטדינין מפני מושב לצים ור' נתן מתיר מפני שני דברים אחד מפני שצווח ומציל ואחד מפני שמעיד עדות אשה להשיאה

It is permitted to go to stadiums, because by shouting one may save [the victim]. One is also permitted to go to a camp for the purpose of maintaining order in the country, providing he does not conspire [with the Romans], but for the purpose of conspiring it is forbidden.

There is thus a contradiction between [the laws relating to] stadiums as well as between [those relating to] camps! There may indeed be no contradiction between those relating to camps, because the one may refer to where he conspires with them, and the other to where he does not; but the laws relating to stadiums are surely contradictory! — They represent the differing opinions of [two] Tannaim. For it has been taught: One should not go to stadiums because [they are] 'the seat of the scornful', but R. Nathan permits it for two reasons: first, because by shouting one may save [the victim], secondly, because one might be able to give evidence [of death] for the wife [of a victim] and so enable her to remarry.

The business of going to a karkom for the purpose of conspiring with the Romans is a bit strange. Perhaps it is like going to the horse races in order to deal with the mob. Still, the strangeness depends on how one defines karkom. Ran defines karkom as a place to go for amusements, while Rashi defines it as a siege works. Still, it is somewhat difficult.

I do some deep analysis of the gemara, and compare what is going on in the derashot there with a derasha from Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, and arrive at the following conclusion, entirely independent of this gemara in Megillah:

I will now offer an answer according to the Ran, who translated karkom as a circular structure built like seigeworks for the purpose of amusement. As I asked before, "Why would one think one conspires there?"

I believe the answer is that the work נתחשב should not be translated as "conspire." Rather, it means perform feats of skill. As I noted before, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi referred to תחבולה. Soncino rendered this as an evil planning - that is, the act of consipiring. Artscroll meanwhile, translated this as "trick or strategem - feats of skill." That is, the performances mentioned in the brayta about the sorcerers and enchanters, or of bukion and mukion, lulion and mulion, blurin or salgurin {various jesters} performing in the karkom.

Thus, נתחשב does not mean to conspire, but rather to perform feats of skill and jest for entertainment. If so, this is a possible meaning for the root חשב.

Let us now return to Megillah daf 28, and to Rav Sheshet's derasha. He writes: בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה.

This now makes perfect sense, and it quite poetic, actually. He states that a synagogue in which they perform this feats of extreme comedy, in the end it will be a house for extreme tragedy. If jesters perform therein, it will eventually hold a corpse overnight. Recall that a synagogue was a place where people saw fit to congregate, so they might have held a sort of jester / entertaining sorcerer exhibition there. Of course, all sorts of meanings from the semantic inventory are available to us for the root חשב, but given the poetic nature of the statement, and the context of kalut rosh, I would select this as the most likely meaning.

If so, it is easy to see how the setama saw Rav Sheshet's (/second Rabbi Assi's) statement as definitional of kalut rosh (especially if both statements were made by Rabbi Assi and were juxtaposed). Rabbi Assi said that in a synagogue, despite preconditions, we do not conduct ourselves with levity. Then, we have a statement discussing jesters (rather than accountants) in the synagogue, with the opposite extreme of tragedy as punishment for doing so. Indeed, the setama's reading of this as definitional is quite convincing.

Halachic fallout
What then, would be the practical fallout, were we to pasken in accordance with my analysis here? We would simultaneously have a big chumra and a big kulla.

First, the kulla. How do we parse the brayta? I would parse it as definitional, rather than disjoint. However, how we parse the brayta is irrelevant, since our synagogues are made with preconditions. How do we parse Rabbi Assi and Rav Sheshet (/Rav Assi's second statement)? I would say that they treat kalut rosh as disjoint from the other activities, with the definition of kalut rosh minimized to only this extreme type of conduct of levity, that of jesters performing. Therefore, if accountants wished to congregate in a synagogue and perform their calculations, it would be permitted. Similarly, other types of personal activities, as well as sichat chullin, would be permitted in a synagogue. Only the extreme levity as defined by Rav Sheshet is prohibited.

Next, the chumra. Here is where I disallow what is done year after year in some shuls. In one shul I know of in KGH, they have a magic show, for the children, in the shul, by an entertainer, on the night of Purim. In one yeshiva I know of, they hold a Purim play in the shul/bet midrash. This would be the very definition of kalut rosh as given in the gemara. Therefore, we should avoid doing so.

Now, for the Disclaimer. Though I had this post in mind a few weeks before Purim, I deliberately held back until after, so as not to get in anyone's way. (I did a similar thing with Tu Beshvat seders, whose post I still have to get to.) And remember, this discussion was not intended halacha lemaaseh. You might wish to consult your local Orthodox rabbi, perhaps printing out this post and the one about circuses.

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